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strikers: "The only Black sit^downer in
the Flint strikes was Roscoe Van Zandt in
Plant 4. At first, the southern white workers didn't know what to make of it. All
they could say to him was, 'What the hell
are you doing here? You haven't got any
job to protect.' ... When it came time for
the victory parade, the strikers voted for
Roscoe Van Zandt to carry the flag out of
the plant." (24)
But even readers long familiar with
such inspiring pictures of the Flint sitdown may find themselves brought up
short by the story of Johnson's subsequent suffering. Blacklisted in Flint,
she embarked on a speaking tour for the
CIO. It left her exhausted; she collapsed
from tuberculosis, losing a lung. Shortly
thereafter she lost her youngest boy,
Jarvis, in a car accident. Then her older
son, Dennis, died of multiple sclerosis.
She and Kermit separated.
Despite these agonizing tragedies,
Johnson was soon remarried to Sol
DolUnger, a socialist and trade unionist,
who would be her steadfast companion
for the next half-century. During World
War II, she became an industrial worker
and effective rank-and-file organizer of
women war workers in Detroit, only to
suffer a brutal beating at the hands of
mafia goons in 1945. In 1977, when invited back by the UAW and GM for a
40-year anniversary celebration of the sitdowns, she declined but showed up to
issue a strongly worded denunciation of
"tuxedo unionism," that is, bureaucratic
cosiness with corporations, and concessionary bargaining, which were destroying the UAW she built.
One can only hope that the militant
labour m o v e m e n t Genora Johnson
Dollinger hoped to see revive will be
aided by Susan Rosenthal's marvellous
oral history. Striking Flint provides a new
generation with the bracing story of
woman who to the end of her life remained dedicated to "social ownership of
the means of production" as the only way
"to stop the ruling class from dominating

humanity, and for working people to
achieve their liberation." (41)
Christopher Phelps
Monthly Review Press
Nelson Lichtenstein, The Most Dangerous Man in Detroit: Walter Reuiher and
the Fate of American Labor (New York:
Basic Books 1995).
THE UNITED Automobile Workers Union
(UAW) has been a popular research topic
of historians, journalists, activists, and
other labour specialists, giving us a not
only vast, but also highly contentious literature on the topic. No single person is
more central to these scholarly and contemporary debates than long time (19461970) UAW president, Walter Reuther.
Discussions of Reuther's leadership often
revolve around the factional struggles
that the UAW encountered — and in
which Reuther played a pivotal role
—during the 1930s and 1940s. Any biog :
raphy of Reuther is necessarily, therefore,
cast into a web of highly polemical and
tendentious debates which seemingly require the author to declare allegiance to
one side or the other.
Nelson Lichtenstein's recent biography of Walter Reuther is a welcome contribution (o this literature. Much to his
credit, Lichtenstein skillfully avoids simply taking sides in the fifty-year debate.
Neither celebrating nor vilifying Reuther,
Lichtenstein attempts to understand the
ambitious politically and socially motivated labour leader within the specific
context which he lived. Lichtenstein convincingly argues that Reuther consistently sought broader social and political
changes, but that Reuther failed when he
became "imprisoned within institutions,
alliances, and ideological constructs that
were largely of his own making." (300)
World War II is the crucial period in
Lichtenstein's analysis. During World
War II, Lichtenstein argues, Reuther
abandoned the shopfloor syndicalism that
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the auto workers utilized successfully in
the mid-1930s in favour of corporatist
solutions. This "Faustian Bargain" provided Reuther access into elite political
and business circles but also required
compromises which hindered his capacity
to transform larger society. While the
UAW made advances for its members, increasing wages, benefits, working conditions, and job stability, the range of possibilities for the UAW to create political
and social change narrowed. When political and social radicalism emerged
strongly in the 1960s, Reuther's attachment to limited collective bargaining
goals, his alliance with the Democratic
party, and his desire to maintain unquestioned leadership in the UAW all hindered
his ability to embrace others who shared
goals of broader social and political
change. He became trapped by the political and social world he had created.
A central component of the bargain
that Reuther made with political and business leaders included, according to Lichtenstein, the control of a sometimes turbulent and unpredictable rank-and-file.
Reuther's desire to achieve political
power and maintain dominance in the
UAW required that the UAW become a
"responsible" union which submitted to a
system of "industrial jurisprudence" to
solve shopfloor problems. This led to the
creation of highly complex, slow, and
often unresponsive grievance procedures,
which left committeemen with little shopfloor power. Early attempts of the UAW
to play a larger role in the workplace
failed to displace traditional management
prerogatives. The UAW and Reuther became attached to strict enforcement of
contracts which both provided material
gains to its members, and sometimes constrained rank-and-file militancy.
In Lichtenstein's analysis, Reuther's
alliance with the Democratic party proved
most limiting to his larger goals. He supported Socialist party candidates like
Norman Thomas in the early 1930s, but
by World War H abandoned any hope of
third party politics. He focused his atten-

tion on realigning the Democratic party,
attempting to transform it into a truly liberal-labour party. Reuther's alliance with
the Democratic party was seductive in its
potential; but real power within the party
proved quite illusive. The alliance led to
some of Reuther's more difficult and embarrassing political compromises. The
tactics used by Reuther in attempting to
undermine the Mississippi Freedom
Democratic party at the 1964 Convention,
for example, were unseemly and belied
his very public support of mainstream
civil rights organizations.
Lichtenstein argues that Reuther became trapped not just by the institutions
which he helped create and the alliances
he forged, but also by an ideological narrowing of political options in the postwar
period. At the same time, we might quibble with Lichtenstein's emphasis of causality on the narrowing of the political
landscape. He argues that the general
rightward shift that followed the 1946
election combined with the growth of
anti-communism led to a "sharp turn
against Communists within virtually all
labor and liberal organizations." (257)
Lichtenstein acknowledges the rank and
often opportunistic nature of Reuther's
widely cast anti-communism, but he also
sees Reuther's attacks as a necessary reaction to the more general anti-communism growing in politics and society.
Anti-communism, in this perspective,
was necessary for the very survival of the
UAW. But this is misleading. Reuther and
other important UAW staffers such as Joe
Rauh played early and critical roles in
legitimizing the pervasive anti-communism that defined postwar American liberalism. In addition, Reuther's anti-communism was much more than a reaction to
the 1946 election and the rightward turn
of American politics. Reuther used anticommunism to bludgeon many of his enemies well before 1946 and often in a haphazard fashion which helped delegitimize
any politics to the left of his own.
Reuther's anti-communism thus had a serious impact in narrowing the political
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possibilities in the Democratic party.
When Lichtenstein argues that Reuther
"positioned the UAW at the left margin of
conventional politics," (303) he suggests
that Reuther analyzed the politics of the
possible and sought the most radical position available. But this is again misleading. Reuther was positioned "at the left
margin" of mainstream politics primarily
because he had made — in liberal organizations like ADA and in the UAW — politics any further left susceptible to anticommunist attacks from many different
quarters.
It is unfortunate that Lichtenstein,
who pays close attention and attempts to
address important political and racial issues in a nuanced manner, fails to address
gender issues. In the early portions of the
books, which deal with the formative
years of the UAW, Lichtenstein contents
with the organization of female workers
into the UAW. But after Lichtenstein follows Reuther's corporatist turn during
World War II, women disappear entirely
from the book. The UAW Women's Department developed into an important organization both within the UAW and
within the larger trade union and feminist
movements. Yet it is entirely absent from
Lichtenstein's study. Moreover, it is
probably not a coincidence that when
Lichtenstein addresses women skillfully,
he relies almost exclusively on the secondary work of other historians, as opposed
to making his own original contributions.
We must conclude that after World War
II either Reuther had no concern for
women's issues or the Women's Department, or that Lichtenstein found them insufficiently important to include. Neither
explanation is very satisfying.
Placing the above criticisms aside,
The Most Dangerous Man in Detroit is a
consistently and convincingly argued
book. It is well informed by the secondary
literature and based on extensive primary
research. Lichtenstein attempts to see
Reuther as a complex and powerful political and trade union leader who operated
within a specific political and social con-

text. He should be applauded for trying to
understand Reuther outside of rank polemical terms, a perspective which will
certainly attract more academic critics
than allies. This is a major contribution to
the already rich UAW historiography
which is sure to continue old debates
while also beginning new ones.
Joseph M. Turrini
Wayne State University
Kevin Boyle, The UAW and the Heyday
of American Liberalism 1945-1968 (Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press
1995).
BOYLE CHALLENGES the emerging argument that during the height of postwar
liberal ascendancy, a centralized and bureaucratized labour movement sowed the
seeds of its own destruction by abandoning hopes for a social democratic breakthrough. He does this by focusing on one
of the largest and most politically active
unions in the country: the UAW. He concentrates his analysis on four national
policy areas (full employment, federal urban policy, African-American civil
rights, and the containment of Communism in Asia) and presidential election
campaigns between 1945 and 1968,
which together lay at the centre of both
the UAW's and the nation's agenda during
this period. He doesn't hesitate to admit
that his approach is unabashedly topdown, institutional history.
Boyle locates the UAW, its top leaders, and especially its president, Walter
Reuther, as the "inheritors of the social
democratic ideological and political formations" that the union struggled to establish in earlier decades, and the forces
that kept the quest for progressive politics
alive. The post-war UAW leadership built
a cross-class, biracial reform coalition
based on unionists, middle-class liberals,
and African Americans. It appealed to
middle-class liberals by supporting economic growth and anti-communism, and

